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GROWTH OF THE POWER OF CONTRACT IN THE
HISTORY OF THE LIABILITY OF COMMON
CARRIERS.
By HUGH E. WILLIS,'
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MIlNNESOTA LAW SCHOOL.

Change, movement, progress! This is the almost universal
order in this as in every other age, and law is no exception to
it. Rather it is a strange proof of the truth. For, in spite of
its rule of stare decisis and its boasted permanency, even law
falls into line with the general tendency and changes. This fact
finds a peculiar illustration in the law of the liability of common
carriers, another modification in which has recently been made
by our Supreme Court.
Whether derived from the Roman law or not, it is certain that
like the Roman law early in English history there grew up classes
of occupations to which attached peculiar liability. These were
the so-called common employments. At first, like other persons
so engaged, common carriers of goods were evidently liable only
for negligence; and later on perhaps liable absolutely only for
loss by robbery on the road. But apparently by the time of Lord
Holt, in Coggs v. Bernard, 2 and certainly in the time of Lord
Mansfield, in Forward v. Pittard,' it was firmly established that
a common carrier of goods was an absolute insurer of the safety
'Dillon, 'or.
*Ld. Ray. 909.
'L. T. R. 27.
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of the same, when entrusted to its possession, except for the act
of God or of the public enemy. The reason for this rule was
the possibility of collusion on the part of the common carrier.
This is what is known as its common law liability. It rested by
law upon every carrier, holding himself out to carry as a public
employment.
Common carriers of passengers also pursued a public employment, but the duty resting by law upon them was never to insure
the safety of the passenger, but to exercise the highest degree
of diligence. There was here no possibility of collusion on the
part of the carrier, and it was likewise impossible for the carrier
to have such control over a passenger as over inanimate goods.
Hence if the carrier exercised this degree of diligence he was
not liable for injury resulting from the act of God, or the public
enemy, or inevitable accident, or where the passenger was guilty
of contributory negligence, or in any other event.
These were the early common law liabilities of common carriers of goods and common carriers of passengers. The object
of this article is to trace briefly the modifications which the years
have wrought.
The carriage of freight and the carriage of baggage were bailments, but of course the carriage of passengers could not be.
Yet, the similarity of the liabilities of the carriers in each case,
the fact that all were exercising public callings, together with
the fact that the same persons were generally engaged in the
carriage of goods and of passengers justifies a treatment of their
liability together.
The greatest changes have occurred in the case of the liability
of the carriers of passengers; but there has been no inconsiderable amount of modification in the matter of the liability of
carriers of goods. In the beginning, common carriers of goods
were liable as absolute insurers for the safety of goods placed in
their possession for transportation, except for the act of God, or
of the public enemy. An act of God was considered to be a
casualty which resulted directly from natural causes and to
which human agency in no way contributed. A public enemy
was an enemy with whom the carrier's nation was at war, and
included pirates on the high seas. Since the time when these
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doctrines were announced, little by little, other exceptions have
been allowed, until now they have the prestige of the old. These
new exceptions are those exempting the common carriers from
liability, in case it is free from negligence, where loss results from
some act of the shipper-the reason for this being found in the
fact that the carrier is denied the entire control and possession
of the property, which even in the theory of the old law he was
supposed to have-where the loss results from the inherent
nature of the goods, or where non-delivery occurs by reason of
a valid seizure of the property by public authority. These added
limitations upon the absolute liability of the common carrier of
goods seem so natural and just that the wonder is they should not
always have been permitted.
But the greatest change in the law of common carriers of
goods was made by the intrusion into this domain of the power
of private contract. History shows that progress has ever been
from status to contract; and as the power of contract grew
stronger and stronger it succeeded in bringing more and more
of the law of common carriers under its sway. But, as far as
the conquest of the law of contracts has gone, it has not entirely
destroyed the old common law liability of common carriers of
goods. A shipper still has the right, if he chooses, to insist upon
having his goods carried by the common carrier as an insurer,
under his public duty. But, if he is willing to enter with the
common carrier into a contract, which is founded upon some
new consideration, the parties may make an agreement establishing and controlling their rights and liabilities in every way,
so long as it does not excuse the common carrier from liability
for his own negligence. This is as far as the development has
thus far gone. Thus, a contract may determine the time of
delivery, or route of transportation, or make a carrier liable for
an act of God, or any of the other common law exceptions. It
may also exempt a common carrier from loss by fire, breakage,
leakage, or dangers of navigation, so long as the carrier is not
negligent. In the same way the time to present claims may be
limited, and the weight of authority holds that the amount recoverable in case of loss may be settled in advance.
The changes in the law of common carriers of passengers
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have also been accomplished through the conquests of the power
of contract. Here it is that the real strength of the force is
displayed. Where the passenger is one for hire, there has not
been so much change in the possibility of decreasing the common
carrier's liability; but by giving a reduced rate of fare certain
conditions and restrictions, like requiring the stamping of a
ticket before return passage, may be imposed upon the passenger,
but the common carrier can not limit its liability for the negligence of itself or its servants. A passenger has been held to be
one for hire, when the common carrier gets any incidental benefit
from the trip. The case of Railroad v. Lockwood,' held that a
drover riding on a pass, issued because of shipment of cattle, is a
passenger for hire. The same rule governs railroad mail clerks.
In the case of all such persons the common carrier can not relieve
itself from liability for negligence.
Where the person is a gratuitous passenger, the common carrier receiving no advantage, if the person carried gratuitously is
willing to relinquish his common law privileges, it seems by the
weight of authority to be allowed him to take all the risks of
transportation. Upon this question there is a variety of holdings
by the various state courts, but the Supreme Tribunal of the
United States has recently decided in favor of the contract
creating an exemption from liability.
In the Federal courts, the entering wedge seems to have been
driven into the wall of liability for negligence in the case of
Baltimore v. Voigt, 2 where the court permitted a railway company to exempt itself from liability to express messengers traveling on its train, when the messenger assents to the agreement.
After taking this position is was easy for the court to take the
next step and hold in the recent case of the Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. Adams,' that a railway can by contract exempt
itself from liability for negligence to a person riding on a free
pass. In this case the court refused to pass upon the question
whether a railway could under such circumstances exempt itself
from liability for wanton or wilful acts, but just what it meant
117
2 20

Wall. 357.

Sup. Ct. Rep. 385.

3192 U. S. 440.
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by this language it did not tell us. Perhaps it is not presumptuous to infer that the court intended not " gross " negligence but acts which would amount to criminal acts. In the
still more recent case of Boering v. The Railway' the court simply reiterated the doctrines of the above case, and in addition
decided that the stipulation exempting the carrier from liability
may be binding although notice of such stipulation is not brought
home to the person riding on the free pass. This is the last word
in this country upon the subject of the possibility of a common
carrier to exempt itself from liability for negligence.
On the one side it may be argued that, if the carriage of passengers were a branch of the law of bailments, it would be
difficult to find a reason for allowing the exemption, as it has
been held all along to be against public policy to allow a man to
stipulate against his negligence in the carriage of goods. However, it is not a bailment relation, and other principles must be
applied. But it is hard to understand how negligence in the
handling of freight and live stock can be against public policy,
and negligence in the transportation of human beings not be.
Independent of the question of bailment it would seem that negligence of any kind ought to be unlawful and wrong, and any
agreement relieving a person or company from liability for acts
of negligence ought to be wrong and against public policy. If
exemption from liability for negligence is against public policy
when the passenger pays his fare, why is it not against public
policy when he is carried free? Where is'there any distinction
between the two cases, so far as this question is concerned?
The argument of those who maintain that the right of exemption should be allowed is that there is no duty resting upon
railroads to carry persons gratuitously, but rather its duty is not
to carry them without compensation; and therefore if a person
wants to take a free pass from the carrier the latter may impose
any conditions and stipulations it pleases; that the person carried
is in no way constrained to accept the gratuity of the defendant;
and* that the number of passes issued is so small there is no
temptation offered to carelessness in the management of trains,
or to an increase in fares. Or, as stated by Mr. Justice Brewer
124 Sup. Ct. Rep. 515.
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in the case of Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Adams, mentioned
above:
" The railway company was not as to Adams a carrier for hire.
It waived its right as a common carrier to exact compensation. It
offered him the privileges of riding in its coaches without charge
if he would assume the risks of negligence. He was not in the
power of the company and obliged to accept its terms. They stood
on an equal footing. If he had desired to hold it to its common
law obligation to him as a passenger, he could have paid his fare
and compelled the company to receive and carry him. He freely
and voluntarily chose to accept the privilege offered, and having
accepted that privilege can not repudiate the conditions. It was not
a benevolent association, but doing a railroad business for profit;
and free passengers are not so many as to induce negligence on its
part. So far as the element of contracts controls, it was a contract
which neither party was bound to enter into, and yet one which
each was at liberty to make, and no public policy was violated
thereby."
In answer to this argument it is said that it is possible and
even probable that passes might be issued to such an extent as to
increase fares and conduce to carelessness in the operation of
trains. A train, carrying the members of a legislature, or a
newspaper convention, every person in which was riding on a
free pass, might be run. The fact that a carrier is not obliged
to issue passes ought to be an argument against its privilege of
limiting its liability in case of negligence instead of constituting
an argument for it. The state has an interest in all of its citizens
apart from the interest which the citizen has in himself, and has
the right to protect his life and limbs. That rule is the best
which will discourage acts of negligence, and forbidding a carrier
to limit his liability to gratuitous passengers would certainly have
this effect.
But, in spite of these objections, the Supreme Court has adopted
the other view. Already the majority of the state courts had
taken that position, and after the promulgation of the opinion
of the Federal tribunal doubtless the rest of the state courts will
fall into line, and we shall have throughout the land one uniform
rule permitting exemption from liability. Whether the theory
will gradually encroach into the territory of the carriage of passengers for hire, and into the territory of the carriage of goods
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and live stock, of course it is impossible to prophesy. It is
enough to say that these are among the possibilities, and that
they are in the line of the progress of the law of contracts. If
this should be the course of the law, it would probably first
embrace employees traveling on free passes, employees of sleeping car companies, and newsboys and other vendors, as there is
no common law duty resting upon the common carrier to carry
any of these parties.
Thus from the time of the beginning of the businenss of common carriers, when their duties were fixed entirely by law, to
the present time, when their duties are so largely fixed by contract, we have an epitome of the development of the law of contracts in the domain of common carriers.
HUGH E. WILLIS.

